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Broad-based black economic empowerment (BBEE) is a policy objective in South Africa. Farm-
worker equity-share schemes (FWES) satisfy several of the empowerment goals specified by the
proposed AgriBEE Scorecard. Information about the costs and benefits of subscribing to an
empowerment label will help managers to make more informed decisions about empowerment and
could therefore promote BBEE. The Thandi label is an initiative to market fruit and wines
originatingfrom FWES andfarms operated by previously disadvantagedfarmers.
A case study of the Thandi label was undertaken to determine whether or not the accredited
empowerment attribute adds value to Thandi products. An exploratory-explanatory case study was
adopted basing questions largely on the theoretical propositions of asymmetric information, the
benefits of product labelling and the preconditions for a successful label. Primary data were
collected via in-depth interviews with managers of Capespan, The Company of Wine People and
empowerment farms participating in the Thandi label. The study made use of in-depth interviews
with key informants to investigate issues considered (on theoretical grounds) to be critical in
establishing a successful label. Responses were subsequently tabulated and compared, where
relevant, across respondents in order to checkfor consensus views.
Results indicate that the Thandi label had not succeeded in differentiating fruit, whereas the Thandi
wine label had increased sales revenue and was covering accreditation costs incurred by farms as
well as the recurring costs of maintaining and marketing the label. Thandi fruit had not grown its
share of the domestic or export markets and did not command a price premium, Capespan
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subsequently discontinued the Thandi fruit label. Thandi wine, on the other hand, had grown its
export market and consumers were prepared to pay a premium for Thandi wine products.
The data indicate that empowerment attributes were useful in finding shelf space for products, but
that quality is essential to grow market share and to earn price premiums. In short, accredited
empowerment attributes can add value to quality products sold to discerning consumers who lack
information about empowerment and quality attributes at the point of sale. Empowerment labels
must include quality attributes. Government should at least absorb some of the transaction costs
confronting producers and marketing agencies in negotiating standards for farms and firms
participating in generic empowerment labels. It could also offer auditing services to local
accreditation agencies to improve their credibility. Further research estimating consumers'
willingness-to-payfor products branded with empowerment labels is necessary to estimate the size of
premiums that different products may command
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INTRODUCTION
Black economic empowerment (BEE) aims to promote business opportunities curtailed by
apartheid in South Africa. Almost all South African firms were owned by white investors
and controlled by white managers during the apartheid era (Jackson et ai, 2005). In 1990,
blacks l occupied less than three per cent of management positions even though they
constituted the vast majority of the population (Gray & Karp, 1993; cited in Jackson et ai,
2005). This study is concerned with broad-based black economic empowerment (BBEE) in
agriculture, where previously disadvantaged individuals (pDI's) acquire equity in the
agribusiness or farm enterprises in which they work. The Broad-Based Black Economic
Empowerment Act, Act 53 of 2003, defines BBEE as the economic empowerment of black
people through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies. An integral part of the
BBEE Act is the Balanced Scorecard and more specifically the AgriBEE charter which
measures companies' empowerment progress, assigning significant weight to the transfer of
ownership, control and skills to previously disadvantaged workers. In particular, this study
deals with empowerment labels and their potential for promoting BBEE in South Africa.
The Thandi label is an initiative that aims to market and promote fruit and wine products
from black empowerment farms. Participating farms must be owned and operated by an
emerging black commercial farmer, or (as is more often the case) they must be firms in
which black farm-workers own at least 25 per cent of the equity. Well structured
farmworker equity-share schemes (FWES) can contribute significantly to BBEE. Knight et
I Indians, coloureds and black people were collectively known as 'blacks'.
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al (2003) found positive relationships between financial performance and the transfer of
ownership (equity), control and skills to previously disadvantaged workers in nine FWES
studied in the Western Cape. Empowerment labelling could add to the benefits of BBEE,
making it a more attractive option for small and medium size firms in South Africa.
According to Vaca (2003), the majority of white farmers are not interested in equity-
sharing arrangements. A case study of the costs and benefits of the Thandi label is,
therefore, relevant as this information will help local managers to make more informed
decisions about the adoption of BBEE.
The main bodies of theory informing this study are those of asymmetric information (e.g.,
Akerlof, 1970; Chalfant et aI, 1999) and transaction cost economics (e.g., Turner et aI,
2000; Promar International, 1999) within the broader field of the New Institutional
Economics (NIE). This theory, along with previous empirical studies on FWES (e.g.,
Knight et aI, 2003; Gray et aI, 2004) and studies on certification and labelling, (e.g.,
Jackson et aI, 2005; Morris, 1997; Vaca, 2003), guide a case study of the Thandi
empowerment label. In 2003, Thandi became the first wine brand in the world to achieve
Fairtrade accreditation, in addition to receiving a gold medal at the International Wine
challenge in London (WOSA SA, 2005). A qualitative study of the Thandi label was
undertaken as it is one of just a fe~ empowerment labels in South Africa, is well
established and displays elements of success (Thandi wine) and failure (Thandi fruit).
2 The author is aware of only six other empowennent labels in South Africa (Excluding Thandi). They are all
wine labels. The labels are New Beginnings, Tukulu, Fair Valley Wines, Winds of Change, Tutuka and
Reyneke (WOSA SA, 2005).
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The presence of asymmetric information can significantly impinge on the efficient
functioning of markets. Information asymmetry between buyers and sellers regarding the
quality of a product can force all good quality products out of a market (Akerlof, 1970).
Product accreditation or certification can provide missing market information about
production processes and product attributes and may, therefore, reduce the problem of
asymmetric information (Golan et ai, 2001). However, producers must contend with the
costs of certification and compliance (Promar International, 1999). Many of the costs
involved with certification and hence labelling are fixed costs whereas the benefits vary
with volume sold. A survey conducted by Turner et al (2000) on South African
agribusiness firms found that the presence of size economies discouraged smaller firms in
their sample from investing in ISO 9000 certification. The Thandi label presents an
opportunity to study horizontal coordination between small and medium-sized enterprises
(SME's) as a means of reducing participants' unit certification costs.
The mam purpose of this study is to investigate whether niche marketing using
empowerment labels improves the competitiveness of black empowered agribusiness firms.
Data gathered in a detailed case study of the Thandi empowerment label are analysed to
distinguish processes that launched the label, and to identify its costs and benefits. This
information is relevant to current and prospective BBEE managers, and to a government
that is seeking ways of making BBEE more attractive to small and medium size
entrepreneurs. This study adds to the growing literature on black economic empowerment
and labelling in South Africa, generating information about its costs and benefits, and
examining institutions that hinder or promote the establishment of a label.
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The first chapter of this dissertation reviews economic theory relevant to the study. Firstly,
the paper sketches the policy environment for BBEE in South African agriculture,
discussing the Balanced Scorecard and introducing FWES. Chapter 1 considers economic
theory underpinning product labels and their potential benefits. The problem of asymmetric
information is discussed illustrating how perceptions resulting from hidden information
affect consumer purchasing patterns. Labelling is presented as a potential solution to the
problem of asymmetric information, as well as a tool for product differentiation and
increasing demand for a firm's product. The preconditions for a successful label are
investigated, as are the transaction costs that this imposes. Various labels are examined,
which like the Thandi empowerment label, are intended to help firms enter a niche market
and hence improve their competitiveness. Comp arisons are drawn between the market
impacts and economic features of these labelling programmes. Chapter 2 presents the
research methodology and data collection procedure for the study. The results for this study




REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
1.1. Broad-based black economic empowerment in South African
agriculture
BBEE has become a major driver of business activity in South Africa (Jackson et ai, 2005).
The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act No. 53 of 2003 defines BBEE as the
economic empowerment of all black people through diverse but integrated socio-economic
strategies. These strategies include increasing the number of black people that manage, own
and control enterprises and productive assets; investment in enterprises that are owned or
managed by black people; and human resource and skills development. Various objectives
of Act 53 include facilitating BBEE by:





increasing the extent to which communities, workers, cooperatives and other
collective enterprises own and manage existing and new enterprises, and increasing
their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training;
increasing the extent to which black women own and manage existing and new
enterprises, and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and
skills training;
promoting investment programmes that lead to broad-based and meaningful
participation in the economy by black people in order to achieve sustainable
development and general prosperity;
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• empowering rural and local communities by enabling access to economic activities;
land, infrastructure, ownership and skills; and
• promoting access to finance for black economic empowerment (Government
Gazette, 2004).
An integral part of Act 53 is the Balanced Scorecard which measures companies'
empowerment progress in four areas, the first of which is direct empowerment through
ownership and control of enterprises and assets. The second and third areas are
management at senior level and human resource development and employment equity
respectively. The final area is indirect employment through preferential procurement,
enterprise development and corporate social investment (Alexander, 2006). Act 53 requires
industries to negotiate a charter with weights attached to each of these empowerment areas.
Stakeholders in the agricultural sector have proposed an AgriBEE charter that assigns
weights to the empowerment areas in the form of scorecard pillars and weightings
(Hofstatter, 2006). Skills transfer and land and equity transfers collectively account for 40
per cent of the proposed overall BEE rating. The rest of the scorecard comprises of
employment equity (10 per cent), management control transfer (10 per cent), preferential
procurement (20 per cent), providing mentoring, access to credit, equipment, inputs and
markets (10 per cent), and corporate social investment and service delivery (10 per cent).
6
'Small enterprises,3 will only have to meet five out of the seven BEE scorecard pillars, with
social investment counting 20 per cent, up from 10 per cent (Hofstatter, 2006).
Local evidence indicates that well structured FWES would attain favourable scores on the
proposed AgriBEE Scorecard (Gray et ai, 2005). Gray et al (2005) found that workers
accounted for more than 40 per cent of the shareholding in three of seven FWES studied in
the Western Cape, and for more than 30 per cent of Board members in five of these
schemes. Four of these schemes scored 100 per cent on the variables used to measure skills
transfer4• In addition, scores for the provision of basic services (e.g. electricity and medical
aid) and improved housing ranged from 80 to 100 per cent for the study schemes.
FWES have been proposed as one means of dealing with the slow pace of land and wealth
redistribution in South Africa (Gray et ai, 2004). The arrangement involves changing the
ownership structure of the enterprise rather than dividing the land into smaller units,
leaving production levels unaffected and with potential for improvement because workers,
as co-owners, have incentives to grow the business. Stated briefly, a successful equity-
sharing scheme at farm or farm level should empower unskilled workers through the
gradual transfer of ownership, skills and control of commercial farming enterprises to
previously disadvantaged workers (Knight & Lyne, 2002; Knight et ai, 2003). The FWES
participating in the Thandi label comply with the key objectives of BBEE. This is a critical
3 Farms with a turnover ofless than R2m/year and employing fewer than 50 people are defined as 'small
enterprises' according to the general codes of good practice released by the Department ofTrade and Industry
in December 2005.
4 The variables used to measure skills transfer include initial training through facilitation; ongoing training;
certification of courses and all shareholders receiving training.
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element of the study, as it may help to illustrate how government can extend BEE labels,
making BBEE in agriculture and agribusiness more attractive.
1.2. Reasons for product labels
1.2.1. Asymmetric information
There has been increased application of the principles of the NIE in agricultural economics
research in South Africa (Kirsten, 2002). Under NIE, some of the unrealistic assumptions
of neoclassical economics, such as perfect competition and zero transaction costs are
relaxed. Kirsten (2002) cites increasing uncertainty about product quality as an example of
increased transaction costs in the market place, which in turn increases the likelihood of
moral hazard and adverse selection problems, as illustrated by Akerlof's (1970) analysis of
the 'market for lemons'. These problems may have far-reaching effects on the efficient
functioning of markets, ultimately resulting in market failure.
Asymmetric information arises where one party has private information (Akerlof, 1970).
Akerlof (1970) explained the concept in terms of the market for second-hand cars. The
price of a near new car is often significantly lower than the price of a brand new car.
Akerlof (1970) attributed this to the fact that the seller and purchaser have different sets of
information, and there is generally an asymmetry of information. The seller is far more
informed about the quality of the car than any potential purchaser and is unlikely to
disclose major defects. If placed in the seller's shoes, the purchaser would more than likely
act in the same manner. The purchaser is well aware of this and hence forms expectations
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about the quality of the car. In aggregate, purchasers may base their willingness to pay on
the average quality of such cars. Owners who believe that their cars are of above-average
quality, will tend to withdraw their cars from this market as they will not be willing to
accept the going price. Previously average quality cars would now be perceived in the
minds of the sellers to be above-average quality, and will consequently be taken off the
market. This process could continue until it is realised by all and sundry that the only cars
in this market are of the lowest possible quality (Morris, 1997). Such an extreme situation
of information asymmetry could clearly pose a serious threat to the efficient functioning of
any market.
There are, of course, a number of mechanisms (signals), in addition to product labelling, by
which potential purchasers can receive better information. Morris (1997) describes a
number of non-price 'market signals' that can indicate quality. These signals include
reputation, expert advice, accreditation and warranties. This leads to the development of a
'new market' where initiatives like certification schemes are used to indicate the true value
of a product. Product certification symbols are incorporated into labels, illustrating the
fundamental role of labels in providing information. Labelling encompasses a producer
displaying information regarding the product category, product-specific attributes, the
brand of the product, or certification of the product by an independent authority (Morris,
1997). Morris (1997) asserts that consumers rely heavily on product labels both to
distinguish between separate categories of products and to distinguish between products
within categories, and that the more differentiable a product is made by its label, the easier
the consumer's overall product selection task is made.
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The result when good quality is driven out of the market by bad quality is an example of
'adverse selection' (The Economist, 2001). Adverse selection is a concern in many
agricultural markets due to imperfect information about product quality (Chalfant et aI,
1999; Holloway, 1999). Branded products such as Coca-Cola are the same everywhere in
the world; consumers know the quality of the product by brand and this reduces the
likelihood of one party knowing more than the other. Successful brands signal consistent
quality, and therefore help to remedy the problem of asymmetric information. A brand label
may not only help to address the problem of imperfect information about product quality,
but may also serve to differentiate a product on other characteristics such as BBEE.
Labelling to address asymmetric information could be a voluntary or a compulsory process.
Labelling offers advantages to producers whose products have positive attributes such as
quality or BBEE. Independent verification of claims made on a label help to establish
customer confidence and loyalty, securing greater market share and premium prices which
are fed back up the food chain to the producer (Rose, 1999). Voluntary labelling imposes
the cost of labelling on these producers with positive attributes, whereas compulsory
labelling could shift the cost to those producers whose products lack the positive attribute
(Fulton & Giannakas, 2004). While voluntary and compulsory labelling can yield the same
economic benefits, they can produce different welfare outcomes for producers. This has
policy implications as producers who participate in an empowerment label like Thandi may
support a compulsory regime that shifts the burden of labelling to producers whose
products are not BBEE compliant. On the other hand, they may prefer to pay for an
empowerment label rather than rely on disincentivised producers labelling their own
product as not BBEE compliant.
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1.2.2. Benefits ofproduct labelling
Apart from promoting market efficiency, labelling can also differentiate a product, creating
opportunities for producers to earn premium prices in niche markets. It is hypothesised that
there is a positive welfare impact when producers choose to label their product (Marette et
aI, 1999; Ward et aI, 2002). Successful product differentiation reduces the number of
substitutes, making demand for a firm's product less price elastic and allowing the firm to
increase demand for the product through non-generic advertising (Crespi & Marette, 2002).
Labelling can therefore increase a firm's revenue through a greater volume of sales and a
higher product price (Hemenez, 2000).
Most agricultural products have characteristics that are classified as credence attributes
(Ibanez & Stenger, 2000). Credence characteristics derive from the nature of the production
process; these are quality-of-life issues including food ethics, the environment, health and
empowerment (Van de Velde et aI, 2005) about which consumers do not acquire
information through use of the product, even after repeated purchases. Examples of these
characteristics include BBEE in production enterprises, and harmful pesticide and heavy
metal residues which are neither visible nor readily testable and their potential
consequences on health are long term. Increasing health awareness has emphasised the
importance of quality signals in food markets (Thompson et aI, 2005; Herrmann & Roeder,
1998). Results of a study conducted by Agbola and Saini (2002) indicate that it would be
inappropriate to ignore the diversity of consumption patterns within society when it comes
to the labelling of a product. To be effective, a labelling programme requires that
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consumers use the information on food packages when shopping. For example, a study by
Nayga (1996) found that nutritional information received less attention from younger, less
educated males. Increased demand depends not only on advertising outlays but on the
number of messages received by individuals as well (Capps & Park, 2002).
According to Ibanez and Stenger (2000), a label has three major non-separable functions.
The first function is to show that the product conforms to safety regulations. The second
function is to differentiate the product by underlining its unique characteristics, and finally
a label provides information about general characteristics such as nutritional composition.
By labelling their product attributes, firms obtain a degree of market power and are
therefore able to raise their product prices. A study conducted by Kim et al (2000) found
that nutritional labels increased the consumption of the nutrients examined. Ibanez and
Stenger (2000) found that a firm selling environmentally-friendly products could increase
revenue by selling with an eco-label. However, their study ignored the costs of signalling
this information. Information may be very costly in which case market failure will persist
(Marette et ai, 2000). The Thandi label may well increase producer revenue owing to the
presence of BBEE credence attributes, but costs of using the label may be prohibitively
high for small enterprises.
Products also embody search and experience characteristics. Search characteristics include
the price and appearance of the good; they are attributes inspected before the purchase of
the good. Experience characteristics are revealed post-purchase and include taste and
storage time (Modjuszka & Caswell, 2000). The relative importance of credence
characteristics has been elevated by international food scares such as Bovine Spongiphorme
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Encephalopaty (BSE) and dioxins (Van de Velde et aI, 2005). These crises triggered
several initiatives to restore consumer confidence in the food chain, including food quality
and region-of-origin labelling.
Food labelling has been an important issue in the United States since the Nutrition
Labelling and Education Act (NLEA) of 1990 replaced the voluntary labelling system
(Harrison & Mclennon, 2004). Government regulation of food labels can be justified when
market failure occurs because of information asymmetry between consumers and food
suppliers (Harrison & Mclennon, 2004). Labelling provides information that can be used in
complex ways by the consumer to maximise utility (Teisl et aI, 2001). The costs and
benefits of labelling depend on the product's search, experience and credence attributes
(Lusk & Fox, 2002). Several conditions arise when a good possesses credence attributes.
Firstly, a consumer never acquires information about these attributes, even after repeated
purchases. This lack of information, illustrated by Akerlof (1970), produces market
inefficiencies and high quality goods are driven out of the market. As a product attribute
moves along the continuum from being a search to an experience to a credence attribute, so
labelling becomes increasingly beneficial. Lusk and Fox (2002) found that labelling
improved the efficiency of beef markets because beef has several credence attributes.
Labelling also allows a firm to differentiate its product, giving it a degree of market power.
The price elasticity of demand is a measure of the responsiveness of the quantity demanded
of a good to a change in its price, ceteris paribus (Petersen & Lewis, 1999). A good such as
insulin is near perfectly price inelastic as it is of such importance to diabetics that if the
price rises or falls, they do not change the quantity they purchase (Parkin et aI, 2005). The
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firm selling a homogeneous product faces a perfectly price elastic demand as illustrated in
Figure 1. Successful product differentiation through labelling makes demand less than
perfectly price elastic and so facilitates non-generic advertising that increases demand for
the firm's product. The firm's revenue increases as a result of increased sales (Q label), and


















Figure 1: Relationship between demand curves facing the industry and the firm









Q* Q label Quantity produced by
firm (Units)
Figure 2: Structural shift in the demand curve facing a firm with a differentiated
product in the domestic market
The obvious source of a structural change in demand is a change in individuals' tastes and
preferences. Consumer education, product labelling and advertising can influence the types
of foods purchased resulting in a structural change in the demand curve (Tomek &
Robinson, 1990). In the domestic market, an empowerment label and non-generic
advertising could well increase both price and quantity demanded as there may be relatively
few substitutes for the labelled product.
In foreign markets, product labelling is less likely to result in a structural change in demand
as there is a relative abundance of substitutes. However, foreign markets offer niche
marketing opportunities where the same quantity of a labelled product can be sold at a
higher price. In particular, these opportunities arise where there are relatively large numbers
of affluent consumers sensitive to the credence attributes on the label. When a firm enters a
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niche market, the result is an increase in demand and a consequent increase in total revenue
as illustrated in Figure 3. Barriers to entry as in the Thandi label case limit further entrants








Q* Q label Quantity produc ed
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Figure 3: Shift in the demand curve facing a firm entering a niche market
A brand is used to improve communication between sellers and consumers. Branding
becomes important when a firm is too small to establish a reputation in the market. It is one
of the only differentiation tactics for small producers (e.g. Thandi participants) competing
in a competitive market against large producers (Mendes & Troskie, 2001). The Thandi
label markets wine in the UK, Scandinavia, Continental Europe and Japan, with the wine
label accessing significant premiums (Jeftha, 2006; Sulcas, 2004). With regards to the local
market, the wine label aims to differentiate and increase demand for its products (Jeftha,
2006).
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1.2.3. Preconditions for a successful label
A number of food quality labels were established to counter low levels of consumer
confidence following the 2003 BSE crises in Europe (Barrena et aI, 2005). These labels
focused mainly on ecological and safety aspects of production methods, thus adding
credence characteristics to products. Barrena et al (2005) found that reduced consumption
of beef in Spain was directly related to worsening perceptions about the quality of beef.
Alternatively, they found that labels certifying product quality helped to restore consumer
confidence and represented the second most important determinant of changes in beef
consumption. The consumer feels more comfortable knowing that the product has been
declared safe by a third-party whose success hinges on reputational capital. Barrena et al
(2005) concluded that a credible label conveying information about how meat is produced
improved consumer confidence. Product certification (accreditation) by an impartial and
reputable third-party lends credibility to a label. Consumers may have difficulty evaluating
product characteristics in the absence of quality certification or testing (Crespi & Maretie,
2001).
The third-party remedy for asymmetric information (accreditation) introduces a separate
market for information about product attributes. Masters and Sanogo (2002) found that
large premiums paid for heavily advertised infant food brands in Mali reflected a
willingness to pay for information about product quality. Product accreditation can partially
substitute for advertising and may be a more cost-effective way of commanding a price
premium. Products accredited with meeting specific standards are entitled to display a
quality brand or logo to inform consumers that those standards are met. If consumers
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perceive that the information is truthful and the label differentiates the product from similar
non-accredited products, they will be more willing to pay a premium for the label. In the
two months following the award of the seal of approval by the American Dental
Association (ADA) in 1960, the market share of Proctor and Gamble's 'Crest' toothpaste
rose from ten to twelve per cent and after two years it had risen to thirty per cent (Morris,
1997). A 1988 survey carried out by Good Housekeeping (GH) found that 16 of the 18
brands carrying the GH seal for the first time showed an increase in sales. In addition, a
1975 study found that consumers ranked 'seals of approval' highest, above 'friends' and
'advertisements' in terms of their 'expertise', and second highest behind friends with
regards to 'trustworthiness' (parkinson, cited by Morris, 1997).
The good reputation of a seller obliges him to supply out relevant information to purchasers
of his product. Reputation is however affected by two main factors according to Morris
(1997). The first is the size of the company that the seller represents. The larger the
company, the higher the cost of adverse publicity if misleading statements about the
product are given out. Secondly, if it is expected that there will be frequent future
interaction between the buyer and the seller, then the seller will have less incentive to lie
about his product, since future sales could be jeopardised. Where these conditions do not
hold, the buyer could seek expert advice, which would be far more valuable than
information obtained from the seller. In essence, product accreditation provides the buyer
with third-party expertise. Morris (1997) refers to the U.S. example of the Association of
Used Car Dealers which allows members to carry a seal of approval that states that their
cars have been tested and conform to required standards. Warranties are also very common
among dealers, generally stipulating that if the product fails to meet specified standards, it
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will be repaired or replaced free of charge. Of course, the effectiveness of the warranty
depends heavily on the credibility of the agency offering it.
Accreditation agencies could be private firms or public organisations regardless of whether
the labelling regime is voluntary or compulsory. One of the advantages of private
certification organisations is that they are able to move quickly to respond to developments
in the marketplace (pagan, 2003). A private certifier with broad certification experience can
use that experience as a basis upon which to build new certification programs in just a few
months, thereby supporting the ability of first-movers within the industry to exploit new
opportunities in the marketplace. On the other hand, implementation of a new government-
sponsored certification program usually takes more than a year to implement (pagan, 2003).
Government certifiers are viewed by some as having a vested interest in certifying products
as the core mission of organisations such as the USDA is to expand agricultural export
sales. Consumers, especially in the ED and Japan, are consequently often distrusting of
government assurances (Fagan, 2003). Thandi participants may perceive lower
certification costs using a subsidised accreditation agency, but recommending public
accreditation would hardly be advisable as the service does not satisfy the non-excludability
requirement of a public good (Fagan, 2003), and private agencies (e.g. Fairtrade) already
provide this service.
A private accreditation agency must have reputational capital at stake to ensure the
preservation of its integrity (Rousseau, 2005). The value of the agent's reputational capital
must be greater than the gains to be made from false certification. Continued prosperity of
an independent, private certifier's enterprise depends solely on recognition in the
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marketplace that they can deliver accurate and impartial information regarding product
attributes (Fagan, 2003). If a certifier favours either the buyer's or seller's interests, this
would jeopardise the foundation of the business, namely market recognition of their
credibility (Fagan, 2003). The larger the accreditation agency, the higher is the cost of
unfavourable publicity following biased or incorrect product certification. Size therefore
adds to the reputational capital of a private accreditation agency, helping to maintain its
credibility and hence the value of its service to consumers and producers.









Adequate, appropriate standards developed and accepted by all affected parties,
trained assessors with standards defining qualifications,
professional and ethical operations at all levels with no bias or conflicts of interest,
consistent and fair certification and accreditation,
transparency,
defined procedures, and
recognition by relevant agencies and customers.
In addition to these elements, Maclaren (2004) contends that successful certification
schemes are demand driven and characterised by low transaction costs.
The cost of providing a credible certification service can be high as product inspection and
testing often requires highly skilled staff and expensive laboratory equipment (Crespi &
Marette, 2001). As a result, producers often face high costs in gearing up to meet
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certification requirements and in using certification services. Much has been written about
high costs associated with country-of-origin labelling requirements (Loureiro & Umberger,
2005) and the costs of detecting genetically modified material in food sold in the European
Union (promar International, 1999). Certification programs must be economically feasible
if they are to succeed. The production and marketing practices in certified growing or
manufacturing must either be cost competitive with uncertified methods, or consumers
must be willing to pay a premium for certified products. Many of the costs (including
transaction cost) associated with certification and hence labelling are fixed costs that do not
vary with the volume of product certified, whereas benefits derived from a price premium
are directly proportional to volume sold. Consequently, the producer's incentive to adopt a
certified label increases with size. A survey conducted by Turner et al (2000) on South
African agribusiness firms found that the presence of size economies discourage small
firms from investing in ISO 9000 certification. Small firms (such as the Thandi
participants) have an incentive to collaborate and share a label in order to benefit from bulk
discounts on the cost of certification services made possible by spreading fixed monitoring
and enforcement costs borne by the accreditation agency. Such horizontal coordination may
suggest policy options other than cash subsidies to promote the access of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SME's) to certification services.
The credibility of a certified label can be undermined by a proliferation of competing
accreditation agencies and deceptive advertising (Jensen et aI, 2004). Lyke (cited by Teisl
et aI, 1999) notes that at least seven independent programs have been certifying forests
across the world. The sheer number of certification organisations and the complexity of
their certification serves to confuse consumers and limits the desired effect of the
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certification (Teisl, 1999). Kangun, Carlson and Grove (cited by Teisl et aI, 1999) found
that approximately 50 per cent of environmental advertising was misleading or deceptive.
A 1990 survey of 1400 British shoppers found that 56 per cent of those surveyed were
suspicious of environmentally-friendly claims (Morris, 1997). In the same year, a survey
carried out for Tesco, found that about 50 per cent of consumers said they would be willing
to pay extra for environmentally-friendly products, yet only about ten per cent of purchases
were spent on green goods.
Mazzocchi et al (2004) state that negative events are more visible than positive ones and
have a larger impact because of their low frequency-high consequence nature. Many South
African companies are fronting as broad-based black empowerment businesses and this has
brought empowerment deals into question (SABC news, 2006). In response, the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is setting up compulsory accreditation
programmes to end fronting and restore credibility in BBEE (SABC news, 2006).
1.3. Voluntary labelling programmes
Labels are primarily aimed at differentiating a firm's product to enter a niche market or to
facilitate advertising that increases demand for the differentiated product. Examples of
labels include environmental, social, organic, country-of-origin, BEE and eco-labels. These
labels all strive to differentiate their product making the consumer's overall product
selection task easier (Morris, 1997). The label promises a particular spin-off or attribute and
the consumer is therefore willing to pay more for the product. The ensuing sections review
voluntary labels for credence attributes. Companies will voluntarily label their product for
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credence attributes if the private benefits of doing so exceed the costs. The net effect is that
the labelling policy will transform such a credence characteristic into a search attribute that
consumers can evaluate pre-purchase by inspecting the product's package.
1.3.1. Eco-labels
The public's increasing awareness of environmental issues since the 1970's has led to an
increase in demand for enviroillnentally friendly products (Loureiro et ai, 2001). Eco-Iabels
are potentially attractive instruments for informing consumers about the environmental
impact of their purchasing decisions, while simultaneously providing producers with a tool
for increasing market share (Hanks et aI, 2002). A common marketing practice used by
manufacturers to emphasise a product's environmental attributes is to display an
environmental seal of approval (ecoseal) endorsed by an independent organisation. The
widespread implementation of ecoseals suggests that they are perceived as an effective
method of altering consumer behaviour (Teisl et aI, 1999, Sedjo & Swallow, 2002). Such
labels offer a solution to missing markets as well as pressing environmental problems. The
effect of an ecoseal varies across individuals and is dependent on the type of other
information available to the individual. Teisl et al (1999) found that ecoseals did not affect
products that were already marketed as using high levels of renewable resources, whereas it
did affect rankings of low price products. This illustrates that consumers view the use of
renewable resources as synonymous with 'environmentally friendly' thus the addition of an
ecoseal added no new information. The German eco-Iabel, Blue Angel, introduced in 1978,
has become a successful instrument in environmental protection with nearly 4000 certified
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products (Hanks et ai, 2002). In the United States, eco-labels are thriving, with programs
such as Green Seal and Scientific Certification Systems (Loureiro et ai, 2001).
Nordic Swan is a successful eco-Iabel developed in Sweden. The label's credibility as both
a quality and environmental label has enhanced the overall image of products. Consumers
have expressed a high level of confidence in the label, and a number of products have
gained significant market share over a short period of time, including Unilever's Omo
detergent (Hanks et ai, 2002). Approximately 50 per cent of the funding for the scheme
comes from member governments, with the balance coming from fees paid by applicants.
There appears to be significant government assistance internationally with regards to eco-
labels. The EU Eco-Label Award Scheme, Nordic Swan, Stichting Milieukeur in the
Netherlands, and Singapore's Greenlabel all receive substantial government funding
(Hanks et ai, 2002).
Blue Flag is an international label that rewards local authorities for providing safe and clean
beaches and marinas. The label has become progressively more environmentally focused
since its launch in 1985 (UNEP, 1996). The Blue Flag is awarded annually to beaches that
meet standards in water quality, amenity and safety criteria, and environmental information
and education. Beaches are measured against strict criteria which span 14 aspects,
indicating that compliance may well be very costly. In South Africa, the Department of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) committed an initial Rl.2 million to the
programme to subsidise the certification fee (Ministry of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism, 2001). The outcomes of a Blue Flag beach include increased tourism, lower levels
of crime, standardisation of facilities to international and national standards, and cleaner
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water and beaches (Brown, 2004; S.A., 2005). However, it may not be financially
sustainable without subsidies.
1.3.2. Geographic labels
Voluntary geographic labels exist because consumers value attributes linked to specific
locations. For example, Thompson et al (2005) found that consumers preferred products
from their own region. In South Africa, Karoo Lamb commands premium prices for
perceptions of high quality and organic attributes (Mendes & Troskie, 2001; McAinsh,
2006).
According to Roosen et al (cited in Loureiro & Umberger, 2005), consumers in France and
Germany indicated that the origin of their beef was more important than other product
attributes such as brand, price, or fat content. In addition, it was found that consumers in the
United Kingdom ranked origin labelling more important than brand labelling. Loureiro and
Umberger (2003) found that consumers in the United States were very concerned about
source verification and labelling issues, and were willing to pay an average of 38 to 58 per
cent more for 'US Certified Steak' and 'USA Grown' fresh apples and tomatoes. Most US
consumers view US produce as safe and of superior quality (Mabiso et aI, 2005).
Santos and Ribeiro (2005) found that wine, cheese and olive oil products from particular
regions in Portugal were able to command a significant price premium. The study
concluded that if the region of origin has a positive image or reputation on the market,
producers from that region can gain significantly by emphasising it on the label. French
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wines, differentiated by geographic labels, grew their share of the British wine market for
several decades (Steiner, 2004). However, their market share began to decline in the early
1990's. Steiner (2004) speculated that this could be attributed to the emergence of a
confusing array of geographical labels under which French wines were being sold, arguing
that a more transparent, flexible and simplified approach to labelling might improve the
French wine position.
Proudly South African is a campaign to promote South African companies, products and
services that are helping to create jobs and economic growth within the country. The
campaign is supported by labour unions, organised business, government and community
organisations. Companies that meet the standards set by Proudly South African can use the
logo to identify themselves, their products and services. An annual membership fee,
towards the cost of compliance and administration, is levied on each member according to
their annual budgeted sales turnover for those goods identified on the member's product list
(Hanks et aI, 2002). In addition, the campaign secured financial and media sponsorship to
the value of almost R80 million from both the private and public sectors. In Australia, a
similar initiative has been operating since 1996. It is estimated that 93 per cent of
Australian consumers seek out Australia-made products knowing they will be supporting
local companies (Proudly South African, 2006). Proudly South African has over 2000
member companies, and more than 5000 consumer products and services have been
accredited. Rapid growth in membership has made it the largest campaign of its kind
anywhere in the world. A 2003 survey involving 3500 consumers conducted by Markinor, a
market research company, found that 85 per cent of respondents would support the
campaign in the future, and the majority of respondents associated Proudly South African
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companies with good quality products and services (Proudly South African, 2006). The
Proudly South African logo is well known and consumer confidence in the brand is
growing both locally and internationally (proudly South African Homegrown Awards
Ceremony, 2005). The following criteria must be met to be a member of Proudly South
African (proudly South African, 2006):
• The company's products or services must incur at least 50 per cent of their
production costs, including labour, in South Africa,
• the company and its products or services must meet high quality standards,
• the company must be committed to fair labour and employment practices, and
• the company must be committed to sound environmental standards.
The campaign was launched in 2001, so it may be too early to assess whether it is
financially sustainable without government subsidy.
1.3.3. Social accountability labels
Social standards in agriculture are essentially process standards (Dankers, 2003). Process
standards are criteria indicating the way products should be made. Social accountability
labels distinguish firms that respect the basic rights of workers established by the
International Labour Organisation (ISO) (Social Accountability International, 2006). In the
agricultural sector, one of the most important initiatives verifying labour standards is the
SA8000 standard (Dankers, 2003). This initiative was developed by Social Accountability
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International (SAl) in 1998. The standard promotes safe and healthy working environments
as well as social justice worldwide (Dankers, 2003).
SAl accredits certification bodies to audit production facilities. Accreditation requirements
include information on how the applicant determines fair wages (Dankers, 2003). There
has, however, been slow uptake of SA8000 in agriculture. Dankers (2003) attributes this to
problems complying with stringent provisions for maximum working hours, particularly
when they are applied to seasonal crops. The cost of compliance can also be prohibitively
high depending on what minimum wages and housing conditions are specified.
1.4. The Thandi label
According to Sulcas (2004), the Thandi project is one of South Africa's most successful
BEE initiatives. The project started as a profit-sharing farming venture between the
Lebanon Community in Elgin, De Rust Estate, their workers and the South African
Forestry Company (SAFCOL) - a South African government parastatal (Petersen, 2006;
WOSA SA, 2005; VinPro Task Team, 2004). Each participating farm must establish a
Farm-workers' Trust. The Trust warehouses workers' shares in the enterprise. Dividends
accruing to the Trust are paid out to the workers according to their individual investment in
the Trust. In 2004, SAFCOL sold its shares to the Lebanon community, effectively
privatising the Thandi project (WOSA SA, 2005).
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The Capespan Foundation owns the Thandi fruit brand with no equity ownership by
participating farms. Thandi Wines (Pty) Ltd owns the Thandi wine brand with participating
farms holding shares in Thandi Wines. These brand names are registered with the
Department of Trade and Industry (Jeftha, 2006; Petersen, 2006). Lebanon farm currently
holds 45 per cent of the shares in Thandi Wines, but will purchase seven per cent held by
Lutouw, which is leaving the Thandi initiative. Paardenkloof (about to join the label having
recently purchased a seven per cent shareholding), Lutouw and Nietbegin equity-share
farms currently own a joint 21 per cent, and the remaining 34 per cent is held by The
Company of Wine People (formally Vinfruco). Thandi Wines is a holding company and has
a marketing agreement with The Company of Wine People to manage the brand's daily
business and to market its wines. The costs of licensing and promoting the Thandi labels,
and marketing Thandi products, have been carried by their respective marketing agents,
Capespan and The Company of Wine People. Tesco's, a UK-based global retailer, has
given Thandi fruit and wine access to markets in the UK, Continental Europe, Scandinavia
and Japan (Jeftha, 2006; Petersen, 2006).
To be considered a Capespan Foundation empowerment farm, participating fruit farms
must utilise Capespan as the exporter of first choice, they must export fruit using the
empowerment brand (Thandi), be commercially viable, and they must be legitimate
empowerment projects (Capespan Foundation and Capespan Group, 2003). The Capespan
Foundation identifies possible projects, helps to structure and finance empowerment deals,
and facilitates Fairtrade accreditation. The Company of Wine People, one of South Africa's
leading wine exporters, provides marketing services, expertise and mentorship to
participating wine farms (Jeftha, 2006).
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To qualify for the Thandi label, participating farms must (Capespan Foundation and
Capespan Group, 2003):
• be an emerging black commercial farmer in the fruit or wine industry, or be an
equity share scheme with at least 25 per cent black ownership,
• meet export quality criteria,
• practice integrated crop management,
• be commercially viable and sustainable in the longer term, and
• use supply chain rebates to grow the wealth of black stakeholders, increase their
shareholding, and further the development of the project.
In addition, all Thandi farms must be Fairtrade accredited. Fairtrade is a non-governmental
organisation (NGO) based in Europe that certifies products from farms that empower
unskilled workers. Premiums are negotiated (between Fairtrade and the marketing agents)
and minimum prices are estimated for target markets. The Fairtrade organisation takes two
per cent of the negotiated premium and the balance is paid into the Farm-workers' Trust.
Farms receive the premiums negotiated on Fairtrade output sold, even if market prices fall
below the estimated minimum level with the marketing agents making up the shortfalls.
Once a farm has been accredited, a training programmeS is tailored to its needs and
delivered by the Fairtrade organisation (Capespan Foundation and Capespan Group, 2003).
The Fairtrade standards for South African farms require that (Paulsen, 2004):
5 Training support is given by Fairtrade and deals with training on budgets, balance sheets, income statements,
and understanding of worker roles in an empowerment structure (Capespan Foundation and Capespan Group,
2003).
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• producers can demonstrate that Fairtrade revenues will promote social and
economic development ofPDI's,
• a monitored plan to share the Fairtrade premium is developed and accepted by
democratic decision of the workers,
• a workplace skills development programme has been submitted to the Department
of Labour, and is regularly updated and internally audited,
• employees participate in approval of budgets, and
• an Employment Equity Plan has been filed with the Department of Labour, and is
regularly updated and internally audited.
Participating farms bear the cost of meeting these criteria (chapter 3.3). Farms that meet
pre-inspection criteria complete a Fairtrade application form and submit it directly to
Fairtrade. Fairtrade sends an inspector to assess the farm, and a report is submitted to the
Fairtrade Board for approval. Once the farm has been accredited, Fairtrade and
Capespan/The Company of Wine People facilitate registration of a Farm-workers' Trust
and any other organisational structures required to manage Fairtrade premium funds
(Capespan Foundation and Capespan Group, 2003).
1.4.1. Thandi wine
There are currently three wine farms (Lebanon, Nietbegin and Lutouw, all in the Western
Cape) participating in the Thandi project. Until 2007, Thandi wine was sold only on foreign
markets with no local distribution. However, Smollan Liquor Division was recently
appointed as its national distributor. Thandi's Pinot Noir is ranked among South Africa's
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top red wines and its Chardonnay and Cabernet are sold all over the world (Sulcas, 2004).
In 2003, Thandi became the first wine brand in the world to receive Fairtrade accreditation
in addition to receiving a gold medal at the International Wine Challenge in London.
Thandi entered the American wine market in 2005 and is focused on growing its share
within the USA. The wines are aimed at the higher end of the market earning significant
premiums and are well known for their good quality (Jeftha, 2006; Sulcas, 2004). The
model has been so successful that several other empowerment wine farms have applied to
join the Thandi initiative (WOSA SA, 2005).
Erfdeel farm, one of the early participants in Thandi wine, was excluded due to poor quality
grapes being produced. The Lutouw farm is also set to withdraw having found a buyer
willing to pay a higher price than that offered by the Company of Wine people for its medal
winning grapes. In addition, it is risky for The Company of Wine People to transport
Lutouw's grapes as their cellar is some distance from the farm and road conditions are
poor. The Company of Wine People prefers to recruit farms located close to its cellars as it
assumes full risk for the grapes once they leave the farm. The Paardenkloof farm (situated
just outside Stellenbosch) will replace Lutouw. The Company of Wine People is
responsible for labelling and distributing Thandi wine to target markets, generating its
income from Thandi wine sales. The Company of Wine People bears full responsibility for
producing, storing and shipping Thandi wine, shielding participating farms from risk in
these processing and marketing activities.
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1.4.2. Thandifruit
In 2004, there were five fruit farms (Lebanon and Erfdeel in the Western Cape, Keboes in
Upington, and Misgund and Sun Orange in the Eastern Cape) participating in Thandi fruit
(Thandi, 2004). Fruit farming was identified as a viable addition to the Thandi stable after
the success of Thandi wine (Thandi, 2004). The vast majority of Thandi fruit was exported
(Petersen, 2006). The marketing agent, Capespan, charges a commission (generally in the
region of six to eight per cent) on the free-on-board (FOB) price received for the Thandi
fruit. The pricing arrangement for Thandi fruit differs from that adopted by Thandi wine.
Participating farms are paid the market price plus the Fairtrade premium only once
Fairtrade has sold the produce in the target markets. Farms do not get their premium if
produce is rejected by the target retailer and sold on the wholesale market. In addition, if
produce is accepted and sold at a retail price below the estimated minimum price, then
Capespan has to make up the shortfall in the premium so that farms receive their full
premium. Capespan and the Thandi farms consequently share the risk of unfavourable price
movements (Petersen, 2006). Thandi fruit has, however, not been successful due to a
number of issues discussed later (section 3.1.). Thandi fruit has not earned premiums, and
perceptions about future growth and financial viability of the label are negative.
1.4.3. Comparison oflabel types
The following subsections draw comparisons between the environmental, geographic,
social accountability and Thandi empowerment labels, focusing on their financial and
market impacts. Hanks et al (2002) compare various eco-Iabels in terms of these criteria.
They define the market impact of a labelling initiative as the success of the product in
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increasing market share, as well as the ability to sell the product at a higher price. Social
benefits (e.g. cleaner environment) are largely ignored, hence comparison of the label types
under the financial aspects sub-heading. Financial aspects relate to the cost and
sustainability of the label. This includes the extent to which financial support is provided by
government. Hanks et al (2002) compares eco-labels in terms of economic aspects, but for
the purpose of the study, it is worth noting that it is private costs and benefits that
determine adoption. Government subsidy may be justified in the case of eco-labels if there
is a positive externality. However, BEE labels do not satisfy the condition of non-
excludability so it cannot be argued that they produce positive externalities.
1.4.3.1. Market impacts
Eco-labels, in general, appear to have a significant level of visibility in the market. Most
Nordic Swan, Blue Angel, and Greenlabel products have shown dramatic increases in
market share and consumers pay a premium for their products (Hanks et ai, 2002). The
Blue Flag initiative has 30 country subscribers worldwide, and is higWy visible in the
market. The City of Cape Town has established an internal task team to undertake an
extensive process aimed at identifying possible beaches as Blue Flag candidates (Brown,
2004). Increased tourism resulting from Blue Flag accreditation suggests a significant
impact on markets (S.A., 2005). However, a proliferation of ecolabelling and deceptive
advertising has increased consumer confusion and eroded consumer confidence in some
environmental labelling (Teisl et ai, 1999).
34
Studies conducted by Loureiro and Umberger (2003), Mabiso et al (2005), and Santos and
Ribeiro (2005) all suggest that consumers are willing to pay a premium for products
differentiated with respect to geographic location. The Proudly South African campaign has
established media partnerships and an increasing demand for its products has resulted in
increased market share and consumers' willingness to pay a premium for assured quality
(Proudly South African Homegrown Awards Ceremony, 2005). Loureiro and Umberger
(2003) found that consumers in the United States were willing to pay significant premiums
for 'US Certified Steak' and 'USA Grown' fresh apples and tomatoes. French wines were,
however, undermined by the emergence of a confusing array of geographical labels that
may have contributed to recent losses in their share of foreign markets.
The SA8000 label is not applied to products and there is no evidence of a differentiated
market for goods produced by SA8000 certified firms. Not surprisingly, uptake of the
SA8000 initiative has been slow. Dankers (2003) cites a study conducted by Nelson et al
(2002) comparing five SA8000-adopting companies with five non-adopting firms. The
study revealed that adopting companies averaged higher revenues than non-adopting firms.
SA8000 adoption also facilitated access to some markets and offered public relations
benefits.
Thandi wine is aimed at the higher end of the market (earning significant premiums) and is
well known for its good quality (Jeftha, 2006; SUlcas, 2004). Thandi has penetrated a
number of European markets and the Japanese market, resulting in a high level of visibility
in the market. Information from the case study introduced in the next chapter was used to
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gauge Thandi's market impact in terms of new participants, changes in volumes sold and
the price of Thandi products, including the ability to command a premium in the market.
1.4.3.2. Financial aspects
Fixed application and annual fees are paid by participants in the majority of eco-labelling
programs despite government subsidisation. To be financially sustainable, fees earned by
the accreditation agency must be sufficient to retain the resources needed to provide a
credible service. Hence, ongoing government sponsorship suggests non-sustainability.
An operating fee is paid by local authorities in the Blue Flag initiative, but DEAT
committed a substantial amount of seed finance to the programme and the increased
tourism revenue may offset the operating costs borne by participants (Ministry of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 2001). Eco-labelling accreditation does involve high
monitoring and compliance costs as in the Blue Flag case. Qualified assessors and
expensive laboratory equipment are required to evaluate whether products meet
environmental standards (Hanks et aI, 2002). Research undertaken in Denmark between
1997 and 2001 indicated that consumers were willing to pay premiums of between 10 and
17 per cent for Nordic Swan labelled detergents (Hanks et aI, 2002), but premiums of this
size may not even cover annual certification costs, let alone costs incurred by the producer
in meeting annual certification requirements. Financial failure has encouraged producers to
take unethical routes to certify their products and to make vague, unverifiable
environmental claims which have brought the credibility of eco-labels into question (Teisl
et aI, 1999).
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An annual fee is levied on each Proudly South African member according to their annual
budgeted sales turnover to cover marketing, monitoring and administration costs (Hanks et
ai, 2002). The campaign secured financial and media support for the next three years
(2006-2008) to the value of almost R80 million. This includes sponsorships, free
advertising time, print and outdoor media exposure and government funding (Proudly
South African, 2006). There is ongoing government sponsorship in the case of Proudly
South African, 'USA Grown' and 'Australia-made' products (Proudly South African, 2006;
Mabiso et ai, 2005), which may suggest non-sustainability. However, 'USA Grown' fresh
apples and tomatoes, for example, do command a significant premium.
Dankers (2003) notes that adjusting minimum wages or housing conditions may be very
costly with SA8000 adoption. The producer or facility being certified is responsible for
compliance and certification. Private costs are high relative to private benefits in the
absence of government subsidy, and uptake of SA8000 accreditation has been low in South
Africa. Dankers (2003) concluded that workers on adopting farms were better off, but this
was largely due to a policy of social responsibility existing before accreditation.
The majority of the costs of the Thandi project have been met by The Company of Wine
People and Capespan. SAFCOL was an active member in the establishment of the project,
and ensured that government played an active role with regards to development and
participation of workers (WOSA SA, 2005). One of the objectives of the case-study is to




RESARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the approach taken to collect and analyse evidence
of the role that empowerment labels can play in promoting BBEE enterprises by improving
the competitiveness of their products. A qualitative study of the Thandi label was
undertaken as it is one of the longest established empowerment labels in South Africa, and
was the fIrst wine brand in the world to achieve Fairtrade accreditation.
2.1. Research methodology
A case study of the Thandi empowerment label used by FWES in the Western Cape was
undertaken to record the processes that launched the label and to identify costs and benefIts
of creating and maintaining it. Case study is a research method involving empirical
investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, using
multiple sources for evidence (Robson, 1993; cited in Pinto da Silva, 2002; Yin, 2002). The
technique facilitates an holistic and in-depth understanding of many mutually dependent
and interrelated institutional arrangements (Tellis, 1997). Case study satisfIes the three
tenets (describing, understanding and explaining) of qualitative research, and can cover
both process and outcomes as it can include both qualitative and quantitative data (Tellis,
1997). The use of a qualitative research design is often motivated by a focus on processes
and not only outcomes (Creswell, 1994; cited in Pinto da Silva, 2002). Yin (2002)
identifIed three specifIc case study designs: Exploratory, Explanatory, and Descriptive. He
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suggested that the nature of the research posed (i.e., 'what', 'how' or 'why' questions)
determines the type of research design to be adopted. This study posed 'what' and 'how'
questions indicating an exploratory-explanatory case study. The questions were based
largely on the theoretical propositions of asymmetric information, the benefits of product
labelling and the preconditions for a successful label discussed in section 1.2.
Case study is a triangulated research strategy, meaning that it uses multiple sources of data.
This attribute constitutes its key strength when compared to other research methods. The
rationale for triangulation is to increase the validity and reliability of data by corroborating
it with data gathered from other sources (Pinto da Silva, 2002). In this study,
documentation and interviews with key informants at different levels of the marketing
chain were the primary sources of information.
A frequent criticism of case study methodology is that replication is not possible and that
this renders it incapable of providing generalised conclusions. However, in analytic
generalisation (case study), theory is used as a guideline against which results from the case
study are compared. In other words, evidence from a case study is generalised to theory
whereas statistical analysis of a representative sample yields estimates that are generalised
to a target population (Yin, 2002).
Interviewing is among some of the most commonly used research techniques to obtain
qualitative information. The flexibility and participatory nature of interviews make them a
very popular choice among researchers (Kuter & Yilmaz, 2001). The interviewer is not
restricted in terms of the order in which questions are asked and can alter questions
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depending on circumstances within the interview. The interviewer also works directly with
the respondent allowing for opportunities to monitor the interviewee and ask follow-up or
leading questions (Kuter & Yilmaz, 2001). The respondent needs to be involved and
engaged in the interview as soon as possible, questions need to be worded clearly and
responses should be encouraged throughout the duration of the interview (McNamara,
1999).
This study made use of in-depth interviewing with key informants to investigate issues
considered (on theoretical grounds) to be critical in establishing a successful label. In-
depth interviewing is meant to encourage respondents to express views and gain an
understanding of the issues under investigation (The World Bank Group, 2006). With
regards to this study, key informants (senior managers) were selected due to their valuable
access to information and the interviews consequently centred on clarifying and gaining
information directly related to the functioning and success of the label.
2.2. Data collection
Primary data were gathered during August 2006 using personal in-depth interviews with
key informants at the Capespan Foundation, The Company of Wine People, and FWES
projects participating in the Thandi label. The interviews were conducted in and around
Stellenbosch on participating farms and at the offices of Capespan and The Company of
Wine People.
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Structured but open-ended questions addressed the history, costs, benefits and challenges of
the Thandi fruit and Thandi wine labels viewed from the perspective of participating farms
and the marketing agents. Information elicited from the CEO of Capespan and the senior
manager of The Company of Wine People centred on the processes and problems
encountered in establishing and maintaining the Thandi label, as well as empowerment
issues, benefits and future prospects. Although similar information was gathered from
participating farms for the purpose of triangulation, interviews conducted at the farm level
focused mainly on the costs and benefits of using the Thandi label. Appendix 1 presents the
questionnaires addressed to respondents.
Managers of two participating wine farms (Nietbegin and Lebanon) and fruit farms (Erfdeel
and Lebanon) were interviewed. The Lutouw wine farm, some 300 km from Stellenbosch,
was excluded due to budgetary constraints. The remaining three participating farms,
Misgund, Sun Orange and Keboes were excluded for the same reason as they are situated in
the Eastern and Northern Cape provinces. Questions relating to farm-retail price spreads
were not answered for reasons of confidentiality.
Responses to structured questions were captured on the questionnaire. Additional
information pertinent to the study was recorded separately. The data were subsequently
collated and compared, where possible, across respondents in order to check for consensus
views. Chapter 3 presents and analyses the results to inform conclusions about the




Capespan CEO, Angelo Petersen, indicated that the Thandi fruit brand had been
discontinued. Petersen (2006) pointed out that Thandi fruit had not grown its share of the
domestic or export markets and did not command a price premium. His perceptions
regarding the future prospects for growth and financial viability of the Thandi fruit label
were also negative. Capespan is currently (2006) South Africa's largest fruit exporter
accounting for 22.4 per cent of the market, followed by Dole SA (7 per cent market share),
and Colors Fruit SA (5.8 per cent market share) (Marais, 2006). Capespan consequently
provided Thandi fruit with an ideal marketing platform as it was able to market through the
global Capespan marketing footprint and had access to world-class infrastructure.
The Thandi wine label, on the other hand, is increasing grower revenue. Thandi wines are
of high quality and very competitive in foreign and local markets. They are exported to
Holland, Austria, Japan, Canada, the UK and, most recently, the US. Patrick Kraukamp,
formerly a forklift operator, is now a world-class wine-maker at the Lebanon farm. His
numerous awards not only attest to the quality of Thandi wines but also to the
empowerment of workers at Lebanon farm. In Australia, four companies sell 80 per cent of
its export wine, whereas in South Africa 17 companies sell 75 per cent of its export wine
(Jeftha, 2006). The Company of Wine People is consequently attempting to get small
producers to join the label, rather than compete against each other.
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3.1. Thandi fruit
Capespan decided to discontinue the Thandi fruit label at the time of the interviews. The
brand failed to secure additional sales volume and neither foreign nor domestic consumers
were prepared to pay a premium for BBEE produced fruit. This outcome highlights
essential differences in the demand for fruit and bottled wine. The demand for bottled wine
is relatively price inelastic, and generally lower than that of fruit, both domestically and
abroad, as it is bought by mostly high-income earners who are less sensitive to price
changes (Ntege, 2005; Hemenez, 2000). The wine consumer is more willing to pay for
credence attributes and, therefore, less sensitive to price premiums than the average fruit
consumer.
A study conducted by Joseph (2003) revealed that American wine consumers earn higher
incomes than the average consumer, and are 28 per cent more likely to have a college
degree or more. The results reported in section 3.2 are consistent with the popular belief
that wine consumers are more affluent and more educated than the average consumer,
including fruit consumers. Demand for quality wine is therefore expected to be relatively
price inelastic, with consumers more likely to accept premiums charged for credence
attributes.
Foreign retailers have ordered Fairtrade accredited fruit from Capespan only to reject it on
arrival (Petersen, 2006). This apparent lack of commitment from retailers indicates
problems with the consistent supply of quality fruit. Rejected deliveries have to be repacked
and sold on wholesale commodity markets because the fruit is perishable. This hold-up
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problem has resulted in a portion of Thandi fruit being sold at relatively low wholesale
prices. As a result, the label did not earn a positive premium overall. Capespan had to
subsidise Thandi fruit, making up premium shortfalls when fruit was retailed at prices
below the estimated minimum price. This helps to explain why it was Capespan that
withdrew from the label, rather than the participating farms. Quality rather than
empowerment is required to earn a premium when selling to fruit consumers abroad.
The fundamental reason for the failure of Thandi's fruit label was that Capespan was
unable to build a brand identity. Fruit is not easy to differentiate, even if quality is
consistently high, because fruit consumers tend to buy on look, feel and price; they do not
seek out a specific brand such as Outspan oranges (petersen, 2006). Consumers trust
themselves to identify good quality fruit. This is less easily achieved with bottles of wine
that are not labelled owing to the absence of touch and smell for example. With less
asymmetric information in fruit markets, quality labels are less likely to command
premiums than in the case of wine markets. Petersen (2006) contends that fruit brands are
better known to the trade than to the end consumer, and the vast majority of foreign and
even local fruit consumers are not influenced by ethical issues like BBEE in South Africa
when making their purchasing decisions. Fairtrade accredited products are typically bought
by more affluent and well informed consumers who account for a small minority of fruit
consumers. Social and ethical attributes create a niche market opportunity that can handle
only small volumes of fruit, and other large sellers compete in this niche market. Under
these conditions, quality becomes important and Thandi fruit was unable to defend its shelf
space. In addition, Edmonds (2006) notes that Fairtrade does not have a large enough
advertising budget to compete with the major brands overseas, and foreign retailers are
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trying to promote their own labels. With Capespan unable to differentiate Thandi fruit
successfully, the brand could not reap the benefits of product labelling outlined in section
1.2.2.
The Fairtrade value chain increases the cost of producing a good making it more expensive
and less competitive. Capespan had to cross-subsidise operating costs it incurred
maintaining the label, and ended up subsidising Thandi fruit to ensure the promised
premiums would be realised by farms. According to Cluver (2006), managing director at
Lebanon farm, Capespan abandoned the label because it made more sense financially to
pack the fruit for foreign retailers like Sainsbury or Tesco using their labels rather than the
Thandi fruit label. Capespan got no meaningful advantage from packing fruit under the
Thandi label as any premiums earned were paid directly to the participating fruit farms as
Fairtrade premiums. The small volumes of Lebanon and Erfdeel fruit meant that Capespan
had to make very small runs in its packhouse if it packed their fruit under the Thandi label,
and this created inefficiencies that reduced the net earnings of all parties. Capespan had to
bear on-going advertising and other marketing costs without receiving any financial benefit.
Discontinuation of the Thandi fruit label means that fruit from Thandi farms will, in future,
carry the Capespan label or the labels of Capespan's retailers. Some of these fruit products
will still be marketed through Fairtrade programmes aimed at promoting market
opportunities for empowerment farms. There was consensus among all respondents that
discontinuation of the Thandi fruit label was in the best interests of both Capespan and the
participating farms. Petersen (2006) pointed out that no other BEE exporters had attempted
to build a successful empowerment brand in fruit.
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3.2. Thandi wine
Thandi wine has achieved much larger sales value than Thandi fruit, and Fairtrade
premiums have been earned on foreign and, to a lesser extent, domestic markets. The brand
is sales driven not production driven (Jeftha, 2006). It achieves economies of scale by using
the same facilities6 to process grapes produced at several empowerment farms. Volumes are
much larger than in the case of Thandi fruit, which does result in scale economies in Thandi
Wine processing. Volumes of Thandi wine exported have increased steadily, reaching
14000 cases (12 x 750 ml bottles per case) in 2006. Thandi sells in the UK in the 5 - 7 GBP
price range which is very competitive with other similar products on the market (Petersen,
2006). Unlike most other wine empowerment labels (e.g. New Beginnings and Tukulu),
Thandi wine is aimed at the higher end of the market (WOSA SA, 2005), and the owners of
the brand have invested substantially in brand development and quality improvement to
capture market share and favourable prices (Jeftha, 2006; WOSA SA, 2005). The exclusion
ofErfdeel Farm shows that the owners of the Thandi wine brand are seriously committed to
maintaining its reputation for high quality wines.
According to Rydal Jeftha (2006), senior manager of The Company of Wine People,
Thandi wine is selling well overseas thanks to its quality and not to 'political correctness'.
The brand was positioned with Fairtrade as a premium product of high quality and good
value for the consumer's dollar. However, these views do not mean that empowerment is
6 All the wine is produced, bottled and stored in The Company of Wine People's facilities on their property
just outside Stellenbosch
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unimportant. Petersen (2006) qualifies Jeftha's views by noting "the fact that producers are
part of an empowerment project might get the product on the shelves but it won't
necessarily get them off the shelves". In other words, while quality is selling the product at
a premium price, the empowerment attribute was instrumental in accessing niche markets.
The implication is that the Thandi wine label succeeded in gaining market share and raising
product prices because it combined Fairtrade accreditation with good quality. Fairtrade
accreditation is based on social and ethical issues and does not incorporate quality as a
criterion for successful certification. Both the Thandi wine and fruit experiences are
consistent with the view that BBEE attributes alone are not sufficient to increase grower
revenue. When combined with consistently good quality, BBEE attributes did help Thandi
farms to access and then exploit favourable markets for products that were purchased by
affluent consumers and for which quality could not be inspected by consumers at the point
of sale.
Wine consumers tend to be well informed about brands. There are ongoing wine reviews
that give quality brands good exposure. Once recognised as a signal of excellence, a brand
name can spread rapidly via word-of-mouth, wine reviews, wine tastings, etc., and facilitate
advertising. According to Petersen (2006), the Thandi wine brand received better publicity
than Thandi fruit, and was able to command significant premiums in reliable markets.
Demand for Thandi's products has become less price elastic through differentiation and this
has facilitated non-generic advertising to increase demand for Thandi wines (Jeftha, 2006).
Wine is less perishable than fruit, which alleviates hold-up problems that might arise if
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Thandi delivered inferior wine. Consistently high quality and the absence of severe hold-up
problems have contributed to a positive overall premium for Thandi wine growers.
According to Jeftha (2006), the successful establishment of a brand label has helped
improve communication between Thandi wine and consumers, which is evidently missing
in the case of Thandi fruit. Jeftha (2006) claims that they have been able to successfully
build a distinctive brand conveying information that is valued by their (discerning)
consumers. This may be the essential difference explaining Thandi wine's success over
Thandi fruit. Respondents constantly emphasised the importance of quality in order to
derive benefit from the empowerment attribute. Examples of the Thandi wine label and
Thandi fruit packaging are displayed in Appendix 2 and 3 respectively.
3.3. Thandi farms
Table I provides a summary of the main findings from the interviews with participating
Thandi farms. With regards to the fruit farms, Fairtrade sells the produce and then pays the
farms. Unlike the Thandi wine farms, the participating fruit farms carry substantial price
risk. If retailers reject the produce it may be sold wholesale, or it may not be sold at all if it
perishes. The Erfdeel farm received a 30 per cent Fairtrade premium, but only for produce
accepted and sold by retailers contracted to Fairtrade. Overall, the premium may not be
positive if a significant share of the farm's produce was rejected and not sold, or sold at
relatively low wholesale prices. It appears that farms were receiving no meaningful
advantage from packing their fruit under the Thandi label. At the same time, Capespan was
making losses on marketing Thandi fruit. The net result is that neither party was benefiting
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from the empowerment label, making it more advantageous to both parties to use
Capespan's regular retail labels (together with Fairtrade accreditation if empowerment
attributes showed promise).
Table 1: Summary of fmdings elicited from participating Thandi farms
Lebanon • Fruit and wine farm
• Only small share of fruit sold via Fairtrade & Thandi
• All wine grapes are sold to The Company of Wine People
• Cost R28000 per year for Fairtrade accreditation, in addition to
time taken from management to ensure compliance
• Received Rl30000 during 2004 & 2005 from Fairtrade premium
for wine, but are unsure about Fairtrade premium for fruit
Erfdeel • Fruit farm
• Approximately half of fruit is sold via Fairtrade & Thandi
• Forced to leave Thandi wine as grapes were not of required quality
• Cost Rl5000 per year for Fairtrade accreditation and about the
same value in time spent preparing and maintaining standards
• Received a 30% Fairtrade premium from 2003-2005 on output
accepted and sold by retailers contracted to Fairtrade
Nietbegin • Wine farm
• Only produce wine grapes and all output is sold with Thandi label
• There has been an increase in absolute quantity of output sold
• Main costs of subscribing to the label is Fairtrade accreditation,
approximately RI 0000 per year plus time costs
• Received R33000 in 2005 for Fairtrade premium
Sources (AlIen, 2006; Cluver, 2006; Wenn 2006)
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Wine farms are paid for their grapes by The Company of Wine People which takes
ownership of, and responsibility for, the crop when it leaves the farm. The Company
transports the grapes, produces wine and ships it to the contracted retailers. There are
consequently two transactions; the farms are paid market prices for the grapes and once the
wine is sold then the Fairtrade premium is paid directly to the Farmworkers' Trust.
Fairtrade pays a premium of €0.05 per kilogram of wine equivalent. The Company of Wine
People obtains its income by selling Thandi wine at premium prices allowing it to cover its
various costs and remain sustainable (Jeftha, 2006). To ensure quality wine, The Company
of Wine People only accepts a yield of 6-8 tons of grapes per hectare. This poses a problem
for farms in the Stellenbosch region where yields tend to be higher than eight tons, and
creates a trade-off between quantity and the quality price premium offered by Thandi.
Nevertheless, the farms7 interviewed displayed an interest in marketing future wine product
lines with Thandi as the general consensus was that it is a profitable initiative and workers
are proud of the label.




Results of this study provide information about empowerment labelling and its potential to
promote BBEE in South Africa. The findings may prove beneficial to current and
prospective BBEE managers, and more importantly to a government which is actively
promoting SME's and attempting to make BBEE more attractive to white entrepreneurs.
A case study of the Thandi empowerment label revealed that the Thandi fruit brand had
been discontinued because its marketing agent, Capespan, had been unable to build an
empowerment brand identity for fruit. The Thandi wine brand, on the other hand, has been
a success. Thandi wines command significant premiums and have established a solid
customer base worldwide. Unlike fruit, wine is not highly perishable, consumers cannot
assess its quality through sight, touch or smell at the point of sale, and quality wine is
purchased by affluent consumers.
Capespan were unable to successfully differentiate Thandi fruit products and fruit
consumers were not willing to pay a premium for Thandi fruit. While the empowerment
label gave Thandi products access to favourable markets it did not keep them there. The
label succeeded where it was applied to quality products sold to discerning consumers who
lacked information about empowerment and quality attributes at the point of sale. These
findings support the hypothesis that product labelling can promote BBEE at farm level by
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improving market access for accredited farms. Thandi wine farms have benefited from
increased revenue and farmworkers have received significant premiums from Fairtrade.
There are a number of other empowerment farms in the region wishing to join the Thandi
label, and this is attributable to the label's success in gaining preferred access to markets
and then exploiting those markets. The evidence presented in this study also support the
view that participating farms, mostly farmworker equity-share projects, have a good record
of broad-based black economic empowerment. In addition, the Thandi wine label has
extended BBEE into downstream marketing activities in the value chain. Overall,
farmworkers are proud of the label and farm managers had little hesitation in stipulating
that they would market future wine product lines with Thandi.
The success of Thandi wine highlights a role for government in promoting BEE amongst
small and medium sized firms. The substantial cost and size economies associated with
certification requires smaller firms to collaborate in a generic BEE label. Such horizontal
coordination suggests policy options other than direct subsidies. For example, government
could absorb some of the transaction costs confronting producers and marketing agencies in
negotiating standards for farms and firms participating in generic empowerment labels. It
could also co-fund market research for empowerment products and offer auditing services
to accreditation agencies to improve their credibility of empowerment labels. At present
these costs tend to be borne by industry organisations.
It is recommended that empowerment labels should include quality attributes and should
focus on non-perishable products purchased predominantly by affluent consumers. A
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product like coffee may be well suited to empowerment labelling as its quality cannot be
easily assessed by consumers at the point of sale. Ideally these recommendations should
have been supported with evidence of changing prices and farm-retail price spreads
following accreditation. Such information would add value to future studies of BEE labels,




BEE aims to promote business opportunities curtailed by apartheid in South Africa. Almost
all South African firms were owned by white investors and controlled by white managers
during the apartheid era. BBEE involves PDI's acquiring equity in the agribusiness or farm
enterprises in which they work. Empowerment labels, if successful have the potential to
promote BBEE, leading to skills development and an increase in the number of black
people that manage, own and control enterprises and productive assets.
Stakeholders in the agricultural sector have proposed an AgriBEE charter that assigns
weights to the empowerment areas in the form of scorecard pillars and weightings. There is
evidence to suggest that FWES would attain favourable scores on the AgriBEE Scorecard
and consequently stay entirely consistent with the key objectives ofBBEE.
Asymmetric information can pose a serious threat to the efficient functioning of a market as
it can drive all good quality products out of that market. Labelling can provide missing
market information about product attributes and may therefore remedy the problem of
asymmetric information. In addition, successful brands signal consistent quality and not
only help to address the problem of imperfect information about product quality, but also
serve to differentiate a product on other characteristics such as BBEE.
Labelling can lead to successful product differentiation which reduces the number of
substitutes, making demand for a firm's product less price elastic and allowing the firm to
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increase demand for the product through non-generic advertising. Credence characteristics
arise when quality is not revealed even after a consumer purchases a product, and includes
the environment, and empowerment. As a product attribute moves along the continuum
from being a search to an experience to a credence attribute, so labelling becomes
increasingly beneficial, emphasising the importance of labelling with regards to BBEE
products.
Product accreditation by an impartial and reputable third-party lends credibility to a label
and may be a more cost-effective way of commanding a price premium. Successful
certification schemes should be demand driven and characterised by low transaction costs,
and can be a very effective measure to counter low consumer confidence.
The Thandi label is an initiative that aims to market and promote fruit and wine products
from black empowerment farms under a separate label (Thandi). All Thandi farms must be
Fairtrade accredited, and receive a negotiated premium on all Fairtrade output sold. Thandi
wine have gained a reputation for high quality and are aimed at the higher end of the
market earning significant premiums. Thandi fruit, on the other hand, has not earned
premiums and failed to secure additional sales volume.
An exploratory-explanatory case study was used in this study. In-depth interviews with key
informants at different levels of the marketing chain were the primary sources of
information. Interviewing is among some of the most commonly used research techniques
to obtain qualitative information. The interviewer is not restricted by rigid processes and
can change the questions depending on circumstances within the interview.
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The main finding from the interviews was that the Thandi fruit label has been discontinued.
It was found that Capespan were experiencing difficulty in differentiating the Thandi fruit
products and substantiating the premium that was charged on the fruit. The label is less
likely to add value to fruit products as they would in the case of wine. Wine consumers are,
in general, more affluent than the average fruit consumer, and have more scope to seek out
products with BBEE attributes.
Analysis of the results indicate that the accredited empowerment attribute adds value to the
Thandi products. When combined with good quality, BBEE attributes did help Thandi
farms to access and then exploit favourable markets. An empowerment label will
consequently only be effective (as in the case of Thandi wine) if it is applied to quality
goods and for products that are purchased by affluent consumers and for which quality can
not be inspected by consumers at the point of sale. The study results highlight the positive
contribution made by the Thandi wine label with regards to empowerment promotion. The
Thandi wine label has gone beyond empowerment of farmworkers and integration of
emerging black farmers into niche markets; it has also transformed the supply chain. The
participating farms are majority owners in Thandi Wines and therefore influence the
contractual arrangements with the marketing agent, The Company of Wine People. BBEE
farms have integrated vertically into the value chain.
The success of Thandi wme, and failure of Thandi fruit, suggest a possible role for
government in extending BEE labels and prove critical to small and medium sized firms in
South Africa as they attempt to make informed decisions about the adoption of BBEE. The
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substantial cost and size economies associated with certification incentivise small firms to
collaborate and benefit from bulk discounts on the cost of certification services. Such
horizontal coordination may suggest policy options other than direct subsidies. Government
could, for example, absorb or reduce the transaction costs faced by producers and
marketing agencies in negotiating standards for farms and firms participating in generic
empowerment labels.
To enhance the role that labelling plays in promoting BBEE in South Africa, it is
recommended that an empowerment label include quality attributes, and focus on the more
wealthy niche market where products are purchased by predominately affluent or
discerning consumers. A product such as coffee could be a potential source for an
empowerment label as it is storable, easier differentiated than fruit, and still retains an
element of asymmetric information. Empowerment labels do add value but have to be
complemented by quality to maintain shelf space and to earn a premium. Empowerment
labelling, if successful, will add to the benefits of BBEE making it a more attractive option
for small and medium size firms in South Africa. Government assistance is, however,
imperative in making it more accessible and feasible for agribusiness or farm enterprises to
participate in a generic empowerment label. Further research estimating consumers'
willingness-to-pay for products branded with empowerment labels is necessary to illustrate
whether these products are able to command a premium in the market and can be
sustainable in the long-run.
57
REFERENCES
Agbola FW & Saini YK (2002). Effect of household characteristics on the decision to
consume staple foods in South Africa. Agrekon 41(4): 280-295.
Akerlof GA (1970). The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 83(3): 488-500.
Alexander M (2006). Black economic empowerment.
http://www.southafrica.info/doingbusiness/trends/empowerment/bee.htm (accessed on
05/03/2006).
Alien R (2006). Personal communication. Managing Director, Erfdeel farm, Piketberg.
Barrena R, Sanchez M & Rosa F (2005). Influence ofproduct perception and quality
label valuation on consumer decision. The case ofbeef in Italy and Spain. Paper prepared
for presentation at the 11 th International Congress of the European Association of
Agricultural Economists, August 24-27,2005.
Brown L (2004). City awarded Blue Flag status for Mnandi and Clifton Fourth beach.
www.capetown.gov.za/presslNewpress.asp?itemcode=958 (accessed on 07/04/2006).
58
Capespan Foundation and Capespan Group (2003). The Thandi concept.
Documentation prepared by the Capespan Foundation.
Capps 0 & Park J (2002). Impacts of advertising, attitudes, lifestyles, and health on the
demand for U.S. pork: A micro-level analysis. Journal of Agricultural and Applied
Economics 34(1): 1-17.
Chalfant JA, James JS, Lavoie N & Sexton RJ (1999). Asymmetric grading and adverse
selection: Lemons in the California Prune Industry. Journal ofAgricultural and Resource
Economics 24(1): 57-79.
Cluver P (2006). Personal communication. Managing Director, Lebanon farm, Elgin.
Crespi JM & Marette S (2001). How should food safety certification be financed?
American Journal ofAgricultural Economics 83(2): 852-861.
Crespi JM & Marette S (2002). Generic advertising and product differentiation. American
Journal ofAgricultural Economics 84(1): 691-702.
Dankers C (2003). Environmental and Social Standards, Certification and Labelling for
Cash Crops. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.
http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y5136e/y5136eOO.HTM (accessed 30/01/2007).
59
Edmonds S (2006). Personal communication. Communications assistant, Fairtrade, United
Kingdom.
Fagan J (2003). Cert ID, a successful example of an independent, third-party, private
certification system. Paper presented at the Symposium, Washington, DC, January 27-28
2003.
Fulton M & Giannakas K (2004). Inserting GM Products into the Food Chain: The
Market and Welfare Effects of Different Labeling and Regulatory Regimes. American
Journal ofAgricultural Economics 86(1): 42-60.
Golan E, Kuchler F, Mitchell L, Greene C & Jessup A (2001). Economics of Food
Labeling. http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/aer793/ (accessed on 10/02/2006).
Government Gazette (2004). Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act.
Government Printer, 9 January 2004, Pretoria.
Gray BC, Lyne MC & Ferrer SRD (2004). Measuring the performance of equity-share
schemes in South African agriculture: A focus on financial criteria. Agrekon 43(4): 377-
395.
Gray BC, Lyne MC & Ferrer SRD (2005). Criteria to monitor the poverty alleviation,
empowerment and institutional performance of equity-share schemes in South African
agriculture. Agrekon 44(4): 465-495.
60
Hanks J, Naumann E, Kothuis B & Hall (2002). Fund for research into industrial
development, growth and equity. NEDLAC Environmental counsel, phase one report.
http://www.nedlac.org.za/top.asp?inc=research/fridge/eco labelling/index.html (accessed
on 28/01/2006).
Harrison RW & Mclennon E (2004). Analysis of consumer preferences for Biotech
labeling formats. Journal ofAgricultural and Applied Economics 36(1): 159-171.
Hemenez M (2000). A little like Goldilocks. Telephony 238(23): 1-6.
Herrmann R & Roeder C (1998). Some neglected issues in food demand analysis: retail-
level demand, health information and product quality. The Australian Journal of
Agricultural and Resource Economics 42(4): 341-367.
Hofstatter S (2006). Friendlier AgriBEE charter sown. Financial Mail, 10 March 2006.
HolIoway GJ (1999). Evaluating the alternatives. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 81 (2): 1090-1095.
Ibanez L & Stenger A (2000). Environment and food safety in agriculture: Are labels
efficient? Australian Economic Papers 39(4): 452-464.
61
Jackson WE, Alessandri TM & Black SS (2005). The price of corporate social
responsibility: The case of black economic empowerment transactions in South Africa.
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper Series, Issue 29.
http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0529.pdf (accessed on 02/03/2006).
Jeftha R (2006). Personal communication. Senior manager, The Company of Wine People,
Stellenbosch.
Jensen KL, Jakus PM, English BC & Menard J (2004). Consumers' willingness to pay
for eco-certified wood products. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Vol
36(3): 617-626.
Joseph, A (2003). Wine market more diverse than you'd think. Retail Merchandiser
43(8):33.
Kim SY, Rodolfo M, Nayga M & Capps 0 (2000). The effect of food label use on
nutrient intakes: An endogenous switching regression analysis. Journal ofAgricultural and
Resource Economics 25(1): 215-231.
Kirsten J (2002). Forty years of Agricultural economics scholarship and practice in South
Africa: A Time to challenge the consensus and refocus our intellectual work. Agrekon
41(4): 251-280.
62
Knight S & Lyne MC (2002). Perceptions of farm worker equity-share schemes in South
Africa. Agrekon 41(4): 356-375.
Knight S, Lyne MC & Roth M (2003). Best institutional arrangements for farm-worker
equity-share schemes in South Africa. Agrekon 42(3): 228-251.
Kuter U & Yilmaz C (2001). Survey Methods: Questionnaires and Interviews: Choosing
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) Appropriate Research Methods.
http://www.otal.umd.edulhci-rmlsurvey.html (accessed on 18/10/2006).
Loureiro ML, McCluskey JJ & Mittelhammer RC (2001). Assessing consumer
preferences for organic, eco-Iabeled, and regular apples. Journal of Agricultural and
Resource Economics 26(2): 404-416.
Loureiro ML & Umberger WJ (2003). Estimating consumer willingness to pay for
country-of-origin labeling. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 28(2): 287-
301.
Loureiro ML & Umberger WJ (2005). Accessing consumer preferences for country-of-
origin labeling. Journal ofAgricultural and Applied Economics 37(1): 49-63.
Lusk JL & Fox JA (2002). Consumer demand for mandatory labeling of beef from cattle
administered growth hormones or fed genetically modified corn. Journal of Agricultural
and Applied Economics 34(1): 27-39.
63
Mabiso A, Sterns J, Vansickle J & Wysocki A (2005). When buying fresh apples and
tomatoes will consumers pay extra to have country of origin labeling? International
Agriculture Trade and Policy Center, Policy Brief Series.
Maclaren FT (2004). A Strategic Overview ofEcotourism Accreditation and Certification:
The Road Forward. The International Ecotourism Society. http://www.world-tourism.org/
(accessed on 19/02/2006).
Marais N (2006). Personal communication. Financial officer, Capespan, Bellville.
Marette S, Crespi JM & Schiavina A (1999). The role of common labelling in a context
of asymmetric information. European Review ofAgricultural Economics 26(2): 167-178.
Marette S, Bureau J & Gozlan E (2000). Product safety provision and consumers'
information. Australian economic papers 39(4): 426-442
Masters WA & Sanago D (2002). Welfare gains from quality certification of infant foods:
Results from a market experiment in Mali. American Journal of Agricultural Economics
84(2): 974-989.
Mazzocchi M, Stefani G & Henson SJ (2004). Consumer welfare and the loss induced by
withholding information: The case of BSE in Italy. Journal of Agricultural Economics
55(1): 41-58.
64
McAinsh G (2006). Organic meat now available in Port Elizabeth.
http://www.theherald.co.za/femme/2003/07/16/food.htm (accessed on 28/03/2006).
McNamara C (1999). General guidelines for conducting interviews.
http://www.managementhelp.org/evaluatn/intrview.htm (accessed on 19/10/2006).
Mendes EJ & Troskie DP (2001). Changing the rules: An incentive for differentiation?
Agrekon 40(4): 593-609.
Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (2001). Environmental Affairs and
Tourism policy speech by Minister MV Moosa.
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/speeches/200 l/sp0626a.html (accessed on
01/04/2006).
Modjuszka EM & Caswell JA (2000). A test of nutritional quality signaling in food
markets prior to implementation of mandatory labeling. American Journal ofAgricultural
Economics 82(2): 298-309.
Morris J (1997). Green Goods? Consumers, Product Labels and the Environment. Studies
on the Environment No. 8. Published by The Environment Unit, The Institute of Economic
Affairs (lEA), London.
65
Nayga RM (1996). Determinants of consumers' use of nutritional information on food
packages. Journal ofAgricultural and Applied Economics 28(2): 303-312.
Ntege SS (2005). Are import prices sticky downwards? The effect of tariff reduction on
South Africa's wine industry. http://www.essa.org.za/download/papers/08.pdf(accessed on
03/11/2006).
Parkin M, Powell M & Matthews K (2005). Economics (Sixth Edition). Pearson
Education Limited, New York.
Paulsen 0 (2004). Standards Guidance for South Africa. Fairtrade Labelling Organizations
International.
http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user upload/content/Guidance South-Africa-
30July04.pdf (accessed on 21/04/2006).
Petersen HC & Lewis WC (1999). Managerial economics (fourth Edition). Prentice Hall,
New Jersey.
Petersen A (2006). Personal communication. CEO, Capespan, Bellville.
Pinto Da Silva PSV (2002). From common property to co-management: Lessons from
Brazil's first maritime extractive reserve.
www.sciencediect.com.elsevier.com/locate/marpol (accessed on 19/10/2006).
66
Promar International (1999). From sub-culture to supermarket: Organic foods grow up.
Management summary, Volume 1: Meeting supply side realities.
http://www.promarinternational.com/pdfs/IndustryStrategicStudies/AgriFoodAgriInputs/Or
ganic%20Ag%20management%20summary.pdf (accessed on 02/04/2006).
Proudly South African (2006). About the Proudly South African campaign.
http://www.proudlysa.co.zal(accessed on 05/04/2006).
Proudly South African Homegrown Awards Ceremony (2005). Address to the inaugural
Proudly South African Homegrown Awards ceremony.
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2005/trn0219.html (accessed on 05/04/2006).
Rose T (1999). Food scares and labelling. Contemporary Review 275(1606): 1-3.
Rousseau S (2005). Enhancing the accountability ofcredit rating agencies: The case for a
disclosure-based approach. A Capital Markets Institute Policy Series, August 2005.
S.A. (2005). Blue Flag flies on SA beaches.
http://www.southafrica.info/plan trip/holiday/sun surf/blueflagbeaches.htrn (accessed on
10/04/2006).
SABC News (2006). NPA to clamp down on BEEfronting practice. SABC news, March
07, 2006. http://www.sabcnews.co.zaleconomy/business/0.2172. 123364,00.html (accessed
on 20/03/2006).
67
Santos JF & Ribeiro JC (2005). Product attribute saliency and region of origin: Some
empirical evidence from Portugal. Paper prepared for presentation at the 99th seminar of the
European Association of Agricultural Economists, August 24-27, 2005.
Sedjo RA & Swallow SK (2002). Voluntary Eco-labelling and the Price Premium. Land
Economics 78(2): 272-284.
Social Accountability International (2006). Stakeholder Collaboration: Consumers.
http://www.sa-intl.org/n (accessed on 31/01/2007).
Steiner B (2004). French wines on the decline? Econometric evidence from Britain.
Journal ofAgricultural Economics 55(2): 267-288.
Sulcas R (2004). Vintage South Africa. House Beautiful 146(9): 1-2.
Teisl MF, Roe B & Levy AS (1999). Ecocertification: Why it may not be a "field of
dreams". American Journal ofAgricultural Economics 81(2): 1066-1071.
Teisl MF, Bockstael NE & Levy A (2001). Measuring the welfare effects of nutrition
information. American Journal ofAgricultural Economics 83(1): 133-149.
Tellis W (1997). Introduction to Case Study. http://www.nova.edu/ssss/OR/OR3-
2/tellis l.html (accessed on 06/07/2006).
68
Thandi (2004). Thandi projects. http://www.thandi.com (accessed on 09/06/2006).
The Economist (2001). Economic focus: The lemon dilemma. Economist 361(8243):1-2.
The World Bank Group (2006). Qualitative Methods.
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNALlTOPICS/EXTPOVERTYIEXTISPMAIO,
,contentMDK:20190070~menuPK:412148~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:384
329,00.html (accessed on 18/10/2006).
Thompson SR, Anders S & Herrmann R (2005). Regional-origin labelling with quality
control: An economic analysis. Paper prepared for presentation at the 99th seminar of the
European Association of Agricultural Economists, August 24-27,2005.
Tomek WG & Robinson KL (1990). Agricultural product prices (Third Edition). Comell
University Press, London.
Turner CR, Ortmann GF & Lyne MC (2000). Adoption of ISO 9000 quality assurance
standards by South African agribusiness firms. Agrekon 16(3): 295-309.
UNEP (1996). Awards for Improving the Coastal Environment: The Example of the Blue
Flag. United Nations Environment Programme, World Tourism Organisation, Foundation
for Environmental Education in Europe, United Nations Publication.
69
Vaca JFA (2003). Equity schemes in South Africa: Benefits delivered to farm-workers as
function of commercial farmers' strategy. MS dissertation, Department of Agricultural
Economics, Michigan State University. http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-
bin/pd[ view.pl?paperid=14826 (accessed on 16/04/2006).
Van De Velda L, D' hooghe K, Kuhne B & Verbeke W (2005). Consumer attitude and
behaviour towards" Flandria" quality labelled tomatoes. Paper prepared for presentation at
the 11 th International Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists,
August 24-27,2005.
Vinpro Task Team (2004). Land reform in the wine industry: The wine producer
programme. A document prepared by VinPro Task Team in collaboration with the Nedcor
Foundation. www.winecharter.org.za/downloads/VinProNedcorFoundation.doc (accessed
on 05/04/2006).
Ward MB, Shimshack JP, Perloff JM & Harris JM (2002). Effects of the private-label
invasion in food industries. American Journal ofAgricultural Economics 84(2): 961-973.
Wenn C (2006). Personal communication. Senior manager, Nietbegin farm, Stellenbosch.
Wosa SA (2005). Transformation of the wine industry. Wines of South Africa.
http://www.wosa.co.za/SA/empowerprojects.htm (accessed on 18/04/2006).
70
YiD RK (2002). Case Study Research, Design and Methods (Third Edition). Newbury
Park, Sage Publications, 2002.
71
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: Questionnaire addressed to key informants





School of Agricultural Sciences and Agribusiness
Discipline of Agricultural Economics
Questionnaire: Case-study of the Thandi empowerment label
SECTION A: CAPESPAN / THE COMPANY OF WINE PEOPLE
1 CONTEXT
1.1 Which were the first fruit/wine projects and in what years were they accredited?
What projects have since come aboard and when? How long does it take to bring a
project on board?
1.2 What did it take to establish the Thandi label? What organisations were involved;
what were the costs and how were they financed; who drove the initiative, what
processes were involved, and what motivated the drivers?
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1.3 How long did it take to implement the label from inception to the production of the
first label?
1.4 What organisations/stakeholders are currently involved in providing the label? Who,
ultimately, is responsible for managing and administering the labels?
1.5 Who is Thandi registered/licensed with? What statutorylindustry requirements must
be satisfied to establish and maintain a label like Thandi?
1.6 Who initiated the discussions that added new projects/farms to the Thandi label?
Did the request come from the farms/projects or from other stakeholders in the
value chain?
1.7 Are all farms III the project FWES, or are there emerging black commercial
farmers?
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1.8 Does accreditation apply to a project/farm, or to a particular product? If an
accredited project produces multiple products, do they all qualify for the Thandi
label? Is the Thandi product range limited to wine and fruit? Does the respondent
know of any efforts to extend the product range? If yes, who would manage and
administer the new product labels?
1.9 What are the eligibility criteria, and who sets them?
1.10 Explain the process and requirements of product/project/farm accreditation.
2 CURRENT COSTS
2.1 Are Capespan/The Company of Wine People financing any ongoing costs
associated with the label and what risks are involved?
2.2 What other organisations are financing any ongoing costs of the label?
2.3 Is the label being promoted in domestic/international markets? If yes, how are




3.1.1 Were any applications for participation in the Thandi label rejected? If yes, who
rejected them and for what reasons?
3.1.2 Did any projects/farms fail while they were participating in the Thandi label, and
are the reasons for failure known?
3.1.3 Did any projects/farms voluntarily withdraw from the Thandi label, and for what
reasons?
3.1.4 Are there any farms/projects in the process of registering with the label? Who are
they and what products will they label?
3.1.5 How many farms are currently registered for the Thandi label? Do they use the
Thandi label on all of their products and on all of the accredited output?
3.2 VIEWS
3.2.1 Should government take responsibility for financing and/or administering
empowerment labels, or should the private sector take full responsibility?
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3.2.2 What are your views on voluntary versus compulsory labelling that requires non-
empowered sellers to declare their status?
3.2.3
3.3 PREMIUMS AND PRODUCT ATTRIBUTES
3.3.1 What products carry the Thandi label?
3.3.2 Does Thandi earn a premium on the domestic market/on the export market? How do
Thandi prices compare with prices of similar products?
Is there a Current (2006) price (R/unit)
premium?
Domestic market Export marketYes
or







3.3.3 Is Thandi growing its share of the domestic market/or the export market?
3.3.4 What attributes are being exploited on each of these markets? Is it only Black
economic empowerment or are other characteristics (e.g. quality, safety or
geographic region) attracting market share or price premiums?
3.3.5 Are there differences between products, where say apples are certified more on
quality attributes, and pears more on geographic attributes?
3.4 FARM-RETAIL PRICE SPREADS
3.4.1 For each product, what attributes are certified and monitored?




Domestic market Export market
Thandi Certified Price paid Price Price paid Price



























3.4.3 For comparable products marketed by Capespan/The Company of Wine People,
what was the farm-retail spread in each of these years?
Prices (RIunit)
Year
Domestic market Export market
Comparable Certified Price paid Price Price paid Price




























3.5.1 What benefits (economic and political) are organisations that finance the costs of
the Thandi label receiving?
3.5.2 What are your perceptions about the future growth ofthe Thandi label?
Below average Above average




SECTION B: PARTICIPATING FARMS
4 CONTEXT
4.1 What products are produced on this farm?
4.2 What products are currently sold with a Thandi label?
4.3 For each of the Thandi products, in what year did you start selling with a Thandi
label?
Products currently Sold with a Thandi label Year in which Thandi sales
grown (Yes or No) commenced
5 COSTS
5.1 What are the monetary and time costs (description of different types of costs) of
subscribing to the label and is it affordable (given current levels of subsidisation by
government/industry) for your enterprise?
5.2 Are there any risks involved in using the Thandi label, and if so, what are there
sources?




Changes in political environment
Other(s)
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5.3 Do you market products that are eligible for the Thandi label through non-Thandi
channels? If yes, why and what alternative channels are used?
6 BENEFITS
6.1 What, if any, price premium is currently attracted by the Thandi label for each of the
products that you sell on domestic and export markets? Have these premiums grown
or contracted over time? Do prices of Thandi products show the same, more or less
annual variation than do prices of similar products marketed without the Thandi
label?
Thandi Price Growth or Annual price variation compared to
products Premium contraction of non-Thandi products
(%) premIUm (Same, More or Less)
6.2 Is there a limit on volumes of any product accepted by Thandi?
6.3 For any particular Thandi product grown on this farm, is all of the output sold with a
Thandi label, or is some output of similar quality also sold on other markets?
6.4 For any particular Thandi product grown on this farm, has the absolute quantity of
output sold with the label increased or decreased over time?
6.5 For any particular Thandi product grown on this farm, has the relative share of
output sold with the label increased or decreased over time?
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Thandi Limit on All output sold Increase or Increase or
products volumes with Thandi Decrease in Decrease in
(Yes or No) label absolute relative share of
(Yes or No) quantity of output sold
output sold
6.6 Are there any tax advantages associated with the label?
6.7 Do you think that the workers are proud of the Thandi label?
6.8 If you introduced a new product line, would you like to market it with a Thandi
label?
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APPENDIX 2: Examples of the Thandi wine label
Figure 4: Front of Thandi wine bottle
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Figure 5: Rear of Thandi wine bottle
APPENDIX 3: Examples of Thandi fruit packaging
Figure 6: Thandi grape packaging
Figure 7: Black growers at a Tesco's supermarket in London
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